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Abstract
“Functional intentionality” is the dominant theory about how
mental states come to have the content that they do. “Phenomenal
intentionality” is an increasingly popular alternative to that or-
thodoxy, claiming that intentionality cannot be functionalized and
that nothing is a mental state with intentional content unless it is
phenomenally conscious. There is a consensus among defenders of
phenomenal intentionality that the kind of phenomenology that is
both necessary and sufficient for having a belief that “there is a tree
in the quad” is that the agent be consciously aware of the meaning
of “tree” and “quad”. On this theory, experiences with a valence
– experiences like happiness and sadness, satisfaction and frustra-
tion – are irrelevant to intentionality. This paper challenges that
assumption and considers several versions of “valent phenomenal
intentionality” according to which a capacity for valent conscious
experiences is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for inten-
tionality (or both).
1. Introduction
One of the most important disputes in the philosophy of mind sur-
rounds the question: Is phenomenal consciousness necessary for inten-
tionality? The dominant theory of intentionality, functional intention-
ality, answers “no”. According to several popular versions of functional
intentionality, a complex system will be in the intentional state of “believ-
ing that p” so long as some state of the system serves as a representation
“that p” and is playing the belief-role in the overall economy of the sys-
tem. For a state of the system to be a representation “that p” it must be
that the semantic elements that constitute the representation are causally
regulated by (or “track”) the objects and properties to which they refer.1
Although functional intentionality continues to be the most often de-
fended (or at least the most often presupposed) within both philosophy
and cognitive science, it is not as dominant as it was twenty years ago.
Phenomenal intentionality is an opposing theory which answers “yes” to
1Two influential sources for functional theories of intentionality that rely on mech-
anisms of tracking are Fred Dretske’s (1981) information-theoretic account and Ruth
Millikan’s (1984) teleological account. Many contemporary theories are built upon
insights from these seminal works.
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the question above and has been steadily growing in influence in the new
millennium. Phenomenal intentionality holds that no matter how effec-
tive a system’s tracking mechanisms and how flexible and adaptive its
behavior, it will still lack genuine mental states with intentional content
if it lacks phenomenal consciousness. To be in a phenomenally conscious
mental state is for there to be something that it is like to be in that state.
The phenomenal properties are how things seem to the agent, from her
first person perspective.
While a complete theory of phenomenal intentionality must address
a range of complex issues, there is value in giving a basic definition that
captures the central intuition of the view without engaging in subtleties.
One method for doing this is to define phenomenal intentionality by ap-
peal to states that are paradigmatically mental and that uncontroversially
possess intentional content. This is the strategy of Graham et al. (2007)
as they make the following claim about paradigmatic mental states, with
perceptual beliefs offered as an example (p. 470):
A mental state is phenomenally intentional in content just in case
the intentional content of the state (viz. what it’s about or repre-
sents or is directed at) is determined or constituted by its conscious
or phenomenal character or what-it’s-likeness alone.
They say that intentional content “presents itself immediately or di-
rectly to the subject” and that “the subject can just tell what he or she
is thinking of” (p. 471). In what follows, I will use the expression “be-
ing consciously aware of X” to capture this immediate phenomenological
awareness of what an intentional state is about.
It should be noted here, that Graham et al. (2007) are not merely
making a claim about human beings and the form that phenomenal in-
tentional content happens to take in the human case. They are making a
claim about the very nature of intentionality. Having a conscious aware-
ness of a specific content is not merely sufficient for intentionality; it is
necessary. While there is room in this picture for unconscious brain mech-
anisms, any such content is derivative in that its intentional status comes
not from its intrinsic properties but only from its integration within a
phenomenally conscious system. The two claims about “consciousness of
content” made by standard versions of phenomenal intentionality are as
follows:
The Sufficiency Claim: For any mental state M, if the agent
is consciously aware that the content of M is C, then M has
non-derived content C.
The Necessity Claim: For any mental state, M, if the agent is
not consciously aware (or potentially so) that the content of
M is C, then M does not have non-derived content C.
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It might seem inevitable that a theory of intentionality grounded in
phenomenal consciousness would make the “conscious awareness of (a par-
ticular) content” the lynchpin of the theory, as reflected in the previous
two claims. It is indeed true, I believe, that for humans the conscious
awareness of what a mental state is about plays an essential role in deter-
mining the intentional content of that state. It does not follow, however,
that this very same property is either necessary or sufficient for intention-
ality per se. We must take care that we are not so impressed with the
characteristics of our own phenomenology that we fail to imagine other
types of phenomenally conscious creatures whose intentionality might take
different shape.
One particular prejudice we will be questioning is the assumption that
each token mental state is a closed intentional unit and that for each token
state it is the phenomenal properties of that very state (and none other)
that are constitutive of its intentionality. Consider two examples: a per-
ception and a belief. When I see the rhododendron in my backyard, there
is a distinctive sensory phenomenology characteristic of perceiving this
kind of green leaf and that kind of red blossom. And when I believe that
rhododendrons are beautiful, there is a distinctive cognitive phenomenol-
ogy characteristic of thinking about rhododendrons and of the concept,
“beauty”. It may seem reasonable to assume that we need go no further
than the intrinsic properties of each token mental state to find the phe-
nomenal properties that make it a mental state with intentional content.2
This paper will challenge that assumption. A case will be made for
the possibility of a creature that “believes that p” even though it is wholly
incapable of being consciously aware that p as well as a creature that fails
to “believe that p” despite the fact that it is consciously aware of p. The
strongest conclusion to follow from these arguments is that the kind of
phenomenology necessary for intentionality is the possession of conscious
states with a valence, not states characterized by a conscious awareness
of content.
2It is important not to misunderstand the claim, here, that according to phenomenal
intentionality it is the intrinsic or internal properties of a cognitive state that determine
that something is a mental state with intentional content. This is not to say that
phenomenal intentionality denies that relational or external properties ever play a
role in determining the specific content of a mental state. It certainly does. But
unlike functional “tracking theories” (for example), which make the right kind of causal
connections – both internal to the system and externally related to the world – both
necessary and sufficient for intentional content, for phenomenal intentionality they
are neither. It is not necessary because a solipsistic mind causally isolated from all
external objects will nonetheless have contentful mental states. Nor is it sufficient
because the only external, relational properties with the capacity to influence the
content of a mental state are those properties of semantic interest to phenomenally
conscious minds.
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2. Valent vs. Non-Valent Phenomenological States
The term, “valence” is commonly used in psychology to identify con-
scious states that are either positive or negative in character. Mental
states with a positive valence include pleasure, joy, happiness, and satis-
faction. Among those with a negative valence are pain, depression, sad-
ness, and frustration. But what about everyday perceptions and beliefs
about objects in the external environment? These are paradigmatic ex-
amples of intentional states. Do they have a valence?
There is some reason to think that they do, at least in human beings.
Our sensory and cognitive states are often woven together with a rich
valent phenomenology. In our own first-person experience, it is difficult
(if not impossible) to separate the non-valent visual phenomenology of
“the look” of the rhododendron blossom (its size, shape, and red color)
from the valent aesthetic phenomenology of “the pleasure” we enjoy when
observing it. And with respect to delicious tasting gustatory perceptions
or disgusting smelling olfactory perceptions, the valence seems even more
intrinsic to the intentional content.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to believe that we have all had perceptual
experiences wholly lacking in valence. (Or, if the valence is a dimension
of the perceptual modality, then the proper description would be an ex-
perience of valence “0”.)3 Further, we know that phenomenally grounded
visual processing and evaluative processing often take place in different
parts of the human brain (Cela-Condea et al. 2011). Brain traumas can
leave intact a patient’s capacity to recognize a loved-one’s face yet de-
stroy the ability to feel the emotional connection that one previously felt
when seeing the person. Capgras syndrome leaves people in the sad state
of thinking their loved ones are imposters (Hirstein and Ramachandran
1997).
And yet, it doesn’t matter whether any human ever has had or could
have a perceptual experience or a belief without valence. Even if not, it
wouldn’t follow that the valent properties were an essential feature of the
perception or the belief qua intentional state. The only question is: Ac-
cording to the standard theory of phenomenal intentionality, do paradig-
matic cases of intentional mental states – like “perceiving a rock” or “be-
lieving that it will rain soon” – require valent phenomenological properties
for them to possess the external-world content that they do? Presumably,
the answer is “no”. Whatever other phenomenal properties a perceptual
or doxastic state might have, the kind of property they possess in virtue of
which they qualify as “perceptions” or “beliefs” is nothing other than the
conscious awareness of a particular content, no part of which is essentially
valent. (The one obvious exception are second-order beliefs about valent
mental states; this special case will be discussed below.)
3This qualification is thanks to an anonymous reviewer.
The Role of Valence in Intentionality 75
If standard theories of phenomenal intentionality are true, then va-
lence is not necessary for intentionality. And given the “necessity claim”
(above), valent phenomenology alone is not sufficient for intentionality,
assuming the valent features are not also accompanied by a conscious
awareness of the content in question.4 The standard assumption, then, is
that valent phenomenal consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for perceptual or doxastic intentionality. Before we consider how either
or both of these claims might be challenged, let us first take a rough in-
ventory of mental states, so that we can distinguish the ones that are
necessarily valent from the ones that are not.
Although it seems quite possible that beliefs could be valence-free,
there are many who would agree that the same cannot be said for all
propositional attitudes. I am going to assume (the widely held view) that
there are some propositional attitudes which are, by their very nature,
valent. If a creature is going to fear that p or delight in p, it must be in a
phenomenal state that has a negative and a positive valence, respectively.
For someone committed to phenomenal intentionality, fear and delight
are not merely functional states, nor can they be reduced to behavioral
dispositions. For an agent to be in those states there must be something
that it is like for the agent to “fear that p” and that something must be
negatively valent. Likewise, for “delighting in p,” that something must be
positively valent.
Figure 1 offers an inventory of some of the most important valent
and non-valent phenomenological types. No authority is claimed for this
classification system. It will fulfill its function if it provides a somewhat
plausible way of sorting phenomenological types that are necessarily va-
lent (labeled “valent”) from those that are not necessarily valent (labeled
“non-valent”). If there is a taxonomy superior to this one, assume that
taxonomy instead. The arguments to follow should go through with any
(reasonable) classification system.
While there are many phenomenological types that are not included
here (like proprioceptive, interoceptive, kinesthetic and somatic), the three
listed in the chart (above) suffice for present concerns: perceptual, cogni-
tive, and algedonic. Perceptual (or sensory) phenomenology includes the
five sensory modalities, with the visual faculty being exemplary for the
rich intentional content that it carries. Cognitive phenomenology features
propositional attitudes – like belief, fear, desire, hope, etc. Both of the
elements that constitute a propositional attitude – the propositional (or
content) component and the attitudinal component – have their own phe-
4For those who think that all mental states have intentional content and, thus,
that I am contradicting myself when I speak of “valenced phenomenology” which lacks
a “conscious awareness of the content” – I must offer a promissory note, with more
explanation to come. The point at issue here will ultimately be shown to be fully
compatible with the view that all phenomenal states have intentional content.
76 Anderson
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Types of phenomenology; for details see text.
nomenal character. A mental state’s propositional phenomenology is the
qualitative character of the agent’s conscious awareness of the proposition
(e.g. “that p”) that is the content of the mental state. A mental state’s
attitudinal phenomenology is the qualitative character of the conscious
attitude that one bears to the propositional content, attitudes like believ-
ing, fearing, and desiring (that p). The attitude of belief is not necessarily
valent; many other attitudes are.
The third category, algedonic phenomenology, is of special importance
to the current discussion. The term comes from the Greek αλγoς (a´lgos,
“pain”) und (ηδoνη) (he¯done, “pleasure”). I will use it to refer to any
phenomenally conscious state (other than propositional attitudes) that has
a valence. (I use it in a way roughly similar to Kriegel 2015). Algedonic
states include not only (1) bodily pain and pleasure, but also (2) emotions
like embarrassment, happiness, and disgust, and (3) other positive or
negative cognitive states like aesthetic pleasure or displeasure, existential
angst or elation, and satisfaction or frustration. (Drawing a sharp line
between valent propositional attitudes and algedonic states is hopeless
because it is so difficult to say when a content is rich enough to qualify
as “propositional”. I am assuming only a very rough boundary between
them.)
This classification system has two broad phenomenological categories:
(I) those phenomenological types that are, by their nature, valent, and
include algedonic states and valent propositional attitudes, and (II) those
phenomenological types that are not by their nature valent, which include
perceptions and non-valent propositional attitudes.
3. Awareness Phenomenal Intentionality vs.
Valence Phenomenal Intentionality
It is now time to consider an alternative version of phenomenal inten-
tionality to the standard one. As a point of comparison, let us consider
how each theory would handle the least controversial intentional states:
Perceptions and beliefs about the external world. (Beliefs about mental
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states – especially phenomenal states – would complicate things unduly
at this stage.)5
With respect to this class of perceptions and beliefs about the external
world, we can summarize, as follows, the received version of phenomenal
intentionality together with its position on the role of valence as it applies
to perceptual and doxastic states about the external world:
NS-Awareness Phenomenal Intentionality (or “NS-awareness
PI ”): For perceptions of and beliefs about the external world,
a conscious awareness of the content of those states is both
necessary (“N”) and sufficient (S”) for genuine intentionality.
It is wholly irrelevant (with respect to intentional content)
whether the perception or the belief has a valence.
In contrast to this position, we will consider an alternative version
of phenomenal intentionality according to which valence is relevant to
intentionality. The rest of the paper will be devoted to the construction of
such a view. The guiding intuition behind the view is sometimes expressed
in general discussions of intentionality but it has rarely been advanced as
an explicit theory. Bill Robinson (1992) has given the clearest expression
of the position I have in mind, but it does fall short of a full-blown theory.
Robinson is an interesting participant in this discussion because he is,
himself, committed to functional (not phenomenal) intentionality. That is,
he does not think that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for genuine
intentionality. Yet, he is not dismissive of phenomenal consciousness. On
the contrary, he is an epiphenomenalist, a property dualist who believes
that phenomenal properties exist and cannot be reduced to physical prop-
erties, yet that phenomenal properties have no causal powers and so do
not figure in the explanation of any behavior. For Robinson, as with many
contemporary epiphenomenalists, it seems reasonable that intentionality
can be functionalized because, on this view, it is only the functional prop-
erties of cognitive states which feature in belief-desire explanations of
behavior.
While Robinson has been an ardent defender of epiphenomenalism for
decades, he did not come by his position without some internal conflict.
In particular, he struggled with the competing claims of functional and
phenomenal intentionality long before most people were taking phenom-
enal intentionality seriously. In his early book (Robinson 1992), he goes
5Beliefs about valenced phenomenal properties are an obvious exception to standard
cases. It can reasonably be argued that one is incapable of understanding an intentional
content that includes a valenced phenomenal concept if one is incapable of experiencing
the valenced property that is being referenced. But this is an exception admitted by
any theory of intentionality that recognizes a first-person requirement for fully grasping
the meaning of terms referring to phenomenal properties, including modified versions
of functional intentionality. This is not about valence in particular and it does not
follow that intentionality, per se, is in any way sensitive to valence.
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through a process (in his imagination) of constructing a robot, adding
more complex features as he goes, and considering, at each step, whether
the new addition confers on the robot anything genuinely mental.
In this process, his Robot “Frp” has reached a level of sophistication
that makes the following behavior possible: When Robinson tells Frp to
go to the pharmacy to get a prescription, it finds a map with which it suc-
cessfully navigates, takes appropriate buses, finds the pharmacy, pays for
the prescription, and brings the prescription back. Robinson claims that
by virtue of this performance the words spoken by Frp (e.g. “pharmacy,”
“prescription”) have genuine intentional content. Nonetheless, Robinson
admits that when we ask the question, “Does the robot understand the
meaning of the words?”, we could mean two different things because of
an ambiguity in the term “understand”. He says (Robinson 1992, p. 54,
my emphasis):
... we have a conflict because “understanding” is (naturally enough)
used to cover two things. One of these is connection to sensation
and feelings; one is connection to appropriate action. We could ex-
press the situation of Robot Frp by saying that it understands what
it says and hears, but that its actions (including its utterances) ul-
timately have no point for it. We could also say, however, that it
does not understand its words (meaning that they ultimately have
no point for it) but that its words do stand for things to which it
is connected both on the input side and in actions. How we put
the matter is not so important; what is important is to maintain
clear recognition of each of the two distinct characteristics that nor-
mal people have and whose possible separability gives rise to the
puzzlement about understanding.
In this paragraph, Robinson seems intent on showing the intuitive ap-
peal of both functional intentionality and phenomenal intentionality. This
actually serves as a fairly plausible explanation for why John Searle’s in-
famous “Chinese Room argument” (Searle 1980) inspires such opposition
among so many readers. Robinson, like Searle, is asking us what we mean
by the word “understand.” When Searle asks if the Chinese Room un-
derstands Chinese, he thinks the only possible answer is “no”. Of course
not all readers agree with him. Robinson has given a nice explanation for
why people give two very different responses to the question. Those who
are already drawn to functionalism interpret the word “understanding”
in the connection to appropriate action way, and those already drawn to
phenomenal intentionality interpret the term in the sensation and feeling
way. This makes the Chinese Room more of a Rorschach Test – regarding
what people see in the English word “understanding” – than a genuine
argument. (This also explains why functionalists are so vitriolic in their
disapprobation of Searle’s argument. Rorschach tests can’t be question-
begging, but arguments can be.)
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Notice the intriguing way that Robinson has chosen to describe the
phenomenal properties (the “sensations and feelings”) that humans pos-
sess and that Frp lacks in virtue of which humans are capable of “un-
derstanding” in this stronger, more phenomenally-rich way. The property
that he thinks is essential according to the phenomenal intentionality per-
spective is the property of “having a point”. Like the phenomenal prop-
erties of perceptual experiences – for example, a sunset “having a look”
or a sandwich “having a taste” – something’s “having a point” is always
indexed to an agent. Just as it is the way something looks to a particular
agent, so too it is the point that something has for a particular agent.
This is the essentially first-person character of all phenomenal properties.
A second thing that “having a point” has in common with perceptual
experiences is that it is normally attributed to an object or state of affairs.
When someone observes a sunset, the state-of-affairs that has a particular
look to the agent is the projected light of the sun as seen through the
atmosphere. But to what state-of-affairs does Robinson attribute the
property of “having a point (for an agent)”? This requires some exegesis
as the text is open to interpretation. Robinson uses the phrase twice in
explaining what Frp lacks:
... its actions (including its utterances) ultimately have no point
for it,
and
it does not understand its words (meaning that they ultimately
have no point for it).
In the first usage, the kind of thing that Robinson says can “have a
point” for an agent are its own actions with special mention of “utter-
ances”. Verbal behavior is one particular kind of action. In the second
sentence, it is linguistic items, “words,” which can have a point. It is not
surprising that Robinson would affirm that it is things like “utterances”
and “words” that can have a point for an agent. After all, we are consid-
ering competing theories of intentionality, and it is words and utterances
which are paradigmatic examples of things that have cognitive content.
If we were to assume that it is only words and utterances (and the like)
that are capable of “having a point” for an agent, we would be left with
little clue as to what kind of phenomenal property Robinson has in mind.
The only other thing we are told is that it involves “sensations and
feelings”. That covers a lot of ground. A defender of the standard (Gra-
ham et al. 2007) version of phenomenal intentionality might argue that
“having a point” is just a quirky, idiosyncratic way of referring to the
conscious awareness of some content, that non-valent property which is
common to both cognitive and perceptual phenomenology. That Robinson
has something else in mind is evident from the first quotation. Robinson
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says that the difference between a human being with a rich phenomenol-
ogy and a conscious-less robot is that its actions in general – and not
just its verbal behavior – “have a point” for it. Utterances are a very
narrow, limited kind of cognitively generated behavior. It is a form of
communication in which I seek to convey intentional content to another.
For example, I want my audience to be consciously aware of the same
proposition that I am currently contemplating. In such speech contexts,
it is hardly surprising that cognitive phenomenology is primary. Yet most
of my intentional states have nothing to do with communication and an
approach that focuses exclusively on cognitive phenomenology will not
generalize to all of our actions that “have a point”.
Robinson makes clear that he is not concerned here merely with cog-
nitive or perceptual phenomenology of a non-valent type. He is concerned
about Frp’s lack of valent phenomenological states, which would (presum-
ably) include algedonic phenomenology and valent propositional attitudes.
Here Robinson has his interlocutor give an argument that one might rea-
sonably use in defense of a version of phenomenal intentionality that gives
valence a more prominent place than on the received version (Robinson
1992, pp. 51f):
There is a structure and order to our behavior that depends, sooner
or later, on consequences for sensations and feelings. Therefore, if
we imagine a thing that does not have any sensations or feelings
(as the robots in this and the previous chapter may not), we imag-
ine a thing from which we have removed the ultimate purposes of
action. There would be no real point for it to its doing anything.
(There might be a point for its owner. For example, if some activ-
ity protected it, or fueled it, its owner would have an interest in its
doing the activity.) If it went to the store, bought chops, cooked
them, and consumed them, its motions would be all performance
with a hollow core of pointlessness, no matter how perfect the ex-
terior execution might be. Since there would actually be no point
(for itself) to its actions, there is no way it could use an examina-
tion of its actions to understand their point. So, even if it could
string together a series of sentences that expressed reasons for doing
something, it would not really understand them, because it would
not understand the last terms (that is, the ones for sensations and
feelings) that describe what is ultimately the point of actions.
The first thing to note about this passage is that it seems clear that
the “sensations and feelings” that would give a point to its behavior are
valent phenomenal states, like algedonic states and valent propositional
attitudes. Our actions have a point for us because we care about them,
they matter to us. And to say that “we care” or that “they matter” just
is to say that the possible outcomes of our actions make us happy or sad,
they give us pleasure or pain, or they are the occasion for great satisfaction
The Role of Valence in Intentionality 81
or frustration. Robinson says that nothing has a point for Frp, that no
matter how “perfect” its performance, it lacks a phenomenally rich kind
of understanding, not for lack of any cognitive phenomenology but for a
lack of valent phenomenology, which Robinson seems to think is the more
serious deficiency.
It is not yet obvious, however, how to take this idea of things mattering
to an agent (their “having a point”) and turning it into a new version of
phenomenal intentionality. Robinson has identified a salient distinction
between functional intentionality and phenomenal intentionality that is
not exclusive to speech acts but is present in all intentional acts. We
have expressions that capture the pointlessness of an action that comes
too late to accomplish its intended goal: “There’s no point in closing the
barn door after the horse has bolted”. When we speak of the point of
something it is usually in regard to the way it contributes to (or fails to
contribute to) the satisfaction of a particular desire. For most of us, the
point of spending many hours planting a flower garden in April is not
just the digging and weeding and planting itself, but instead the aesthetic
pleasure we enjoy in the summer when the flowers bloom. There would
be no point (for most of us) to plant in April if we knew a flood in May
would wash away all of our plants.
If we interpret Robinson’s words in this way, we can use the flower-
planting case to draw the distinction between a human who possesses
phenomenal intentionality and a conscious-less robot who lacks it. If
robot Frp were to plant a garden it would have no point for it because Frp
has no desires grounded in phenomenally conscious experience (call these
“phenomenal desires”). It is incapable of experiencing aesthetic pleasure
of a phenomenal kind and so its “perception” of the rose in July doesn’t
have a point for Frp the way it would for us.
This is not to say, of course, that Frp couldn’t have functional desires.
Frp’s primary behavioral imperative could be to plant flowers in April. In
fact, Frp’s executive control mechanisms could have all of the functional
properties that human gardeners’ phenomenal desires have. Frp’s flower-
planting-behavior could be conditional upon first computing a low prob-
ability of a garden-wrecking flood in May. Frp might even say, “There
is no point for me to plant roses in April because a flood is coming in
May.” Frp could behave as if it mattered to it that there be blossoms in
July because its behavior (verbal and otherwise) could be regulated by
a functional desire for blossoms in July. But Robinson’s claim seems to
be that no functional properties, no mere dispositions to behave – absent
sensation and feeling – are sufficient for its actions to have a point for it.
Since it has no phenomenal desires or any other valent states, none of its
actions will have the kind of “point” for it that phenomenal consciousness
makes possible for us.
Before turning to the task of applying these insights to a theory of
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intentionality, we remind the reader, lest there be any confusion, that
Robinson will not ultimately support any of these efforts. He is com-
mitted to functional intentionality and will reject all possible versions
of phenomenal intentionality. He holds that Robot Frp’s words have gen-
uine intentional content by virtue of Frp’s functional-behavioral properties
alone. His insight was simply to draw attention to a family of phenome-
nal properties that contribute to their “being a point” for an agent. He
acknowledges that these properties enhance the value of human existence
but he ultimately concludes that these properties are not necessary for
intentionality. So with one hand he honors Frp with the classification “in-
tentional agent” and with the other he concedes (and almost bemoans)
that Frp is plagued by “a hollow core of pointlesseness”. Robinson may be
interested in where our road leads, but he will not be taking the journey
with us.
Assuming that we have accurately captured Robinson’s central point,
how might this impact a theory of intentionality? There is both a stronger
and a weaker position we could take. Let us begin with the stronger.
On the strongest, priority is given to the following brief passage from
Robinson:
... a thing [without] ... sensations or feelings [is] ... a thing from
which we have removed the ultimate purposes of action. There
would be no real point for it to its doing anything.
If there is “no real point for it to its doing anything,” then this applies
as much to its own (purported) intentional states, like perceptions and
beliefs, as to anything else and the fact that none of Frp’s own (candidate)
intentional states matter to it could undermine their status as genuine
mental states. But why exactly? The reasoning is this. Frp has no desire
– no phenomenal (valent) desire – to believe what is true. Its own “beliefs”
don’t matter to it. Truth and falsity don’t matter to it. Its own behavior
has no point for it.
Of course you can still predict Frp’s behavior by appeal to its func-
tional beliefs (its information-bearing states) and its functional desires (its
behavioral control conditionals), but this is nothing but the operations of
a conscious-less mechanism. There exists no genuine agent with whom
any intentional content could reside. If Frp did care, if things did matter
to it, if it had a strong phenomenal desire to know truths about the world,
and if it enjoyed rich algedonic responses to its own cognitive states as
well as states of the world, then this valent perspective would constitute
a locus of agency.
It is now time to consider the theory we will call valence phenomenal
intentionality, which comes in different strengths. It can be advanced as
a necessary condition, a sufficient condition, or both. We will leave until
later the choice among these options and begin with the generic version.
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Valence Phenomenal Intentionality (the generic version): For
an agent to have genuine intentional states it is either neces-
sary or sufficient or both that it has states with contents that
matter to the agent. For something “to matter to an agent”
it must be the case that the agent has valent states that are
sensitive to the output of content-bearing states.
Robinson’s insight is of most interest if we interpret it as supporting
some version of this position. Some might argue that we may have over-
reached. There is an alternative, weaker interpretation of the insight,
which will be described only briefly. Earlier, the definition of awareness
phenomenal intentionality focused exclusively on content about the exter-
nal world. This was done to exclude mental states where the content of
one’s thought is another (valent) mental state. It is now time to bring
phenomenal concepts back into the picture.
We have intentional states that include phenomenal concepts. I have
a phenomenal conception of pain when I am thinking about it in terms
of how it feels. An agent incapable of experiencing valent phenomenal
state V will be incapable of having an intentional state that includes
the phenomenal concept V. If we assume this is true, as do virtually
all defenders of phenomenal intentionality and even some defenders of
functional intentionality, then a theory of intentionality should make the
following weak concession to valent phenomenal states:
The Phenomenal Concept Requirement: If an agent is to have
an intentional state that includes a phenomenal concept, then
the agent must have first-person experience of the phenomenal
property picked out by the concept.
Note how weak a concession this is. Functionalists about intentional-
ity who believe that robots have a complex set of intentional states can
nonetheless admit that they are incapable of intentional states which in-
clude phenomenal concepts. This is of a kind with the admission that
human beings do not have full mastery of the phenomenal concept of bat-
echolocation, because we don’t know what it is like to “sonar” objects in
our environment.
A weaker interpretation of Robinson’s original text might support only
an expanded scope for phenomenal concepts so that they are invoked by
many more terms in the English language than we might have initially
supposed. In addition to obvious properties like the “taste of pineapple”
or the “look of a red rose”, it may be that “gardening” and “making din-
ner” and many other terms for human behavior are subtly infused with
meaning drawn from the valent phenomenal experiences that ultimately
motivate those behaviors. If so, then a machine incapable of phenomenal
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consciousness will not understand what gardening is even if it can dis-
tinguish cases of gardening-behavior as reliably as any human. On this
weaker interpretation of Robinson’s insight, it isn’t intentionality per se
that requires valent phenomenology but simply a significant percentage
of terms in the English language. On this reading, a robot would have
genuine intentionality, it would only suffer from a much reduced working
vocabulary (Robinson 1992, pp. 51f, especially encourages this interpre-
tation).
It is probably evident at this point that I am not ultimately in the busi-
ness of “William Robinson exegesis”. I will not speculate about whether
Robinson intended his talk of “understanding” grounded in sensation and
feeling to be interpreted as a nod towards valent phenomenal intentional-
ity or only to an expanded scope for phenomenal concepts. Whether true
to Robinson’s intentions or not, we will focus on the stronger view and
consider the various versions of valent phenomenal intentionality, because
they offer a fascinating challenge to established orthodoxy. In the space
remaining, we will consider two hypothetical cases which will allow us
to compare, side-by-side, the virtues of the standard view and its new
challenger.
4. Creatures without Valence vs.
Creatures without Cognitive Awareness
In testing our considered judgments about which properties are and
are not necessary for intentionality, it is standard practice to compare
humans (with a rich phenomenology) to robots (with no phenomenology).
The problem with these test cases, for present purposes, is that they
provide no help whatsoever in discerning the relative importance of non-
valent cognitive phenomenology as compared to valent phenomenology.
Humans have both; robots have neither. What is required are cases where
the two kinds of phenomenology come apart, with one creature having
only the first type and another creature having only the second type.
(Figure 2 shows the phenomenological capacities of the two creatures to
be considered.)
4.1 Case 1: Avalcogniphen Has Cognitive
But No Valent Phenomenology
The standard view, NS-awareness PI, reduced to its simplest principle,
holds that a “conscious awareness of the content” of what one is perceiving
or believing is both necessary and sufficient for having intentional states
of a perceptual or doxastic kind. Since valence is no part of this picture,
let us imagine a creature with a brain capable of producing non-valent
conscious awareness of content – of both a sensory and a propositional kind
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Figure 2: Phenomenological capacities of the creatures considered
in the text.
– and a brain incapable of producing valent experiences of any kind. Call
this creature “Avalcogniphen” or “Aval” for short. The “a-val” captures
the fact that it has no valent phenomenology; the “-cogniphen” reflects its
capacity for cognitive phenomenology. (Henceforth, we will use “cognitive
phenomenology” as an umbrella term to refer to any phenomenal state
in which the intentional content of the state is determined by a conscious
awareness of what is being perceived, believed, or otherwise cognized. This
is broader than standard usage.)
We will consider two kinds of Avals. A “passive Aval” has no behav-
ioral dispositions of any kind. Not only does it lack the kind of behavioral
dispositions grounded in valent phenomenological states that motivate hu-
man behavior, but it also lacks the kind of purely mechanistic, behavioral
control mechanisms that produce autonomous behavior in robots. It lacks
the capacity for any self-generated behavior. Its sole capacities are that
of a “cognitive observer”. It sits wherever it is placed, it eats (and doesn’t
die) if someone feeds it, and it observes (in a phenomenal way) whatever
part of the world is present to its sensory faculties. Since none of its
mental states have valence, nothing matters to it. It doesn’t care about
anything that it sees or believes. It doesn’t care where it is or where it
goes.
The second type, the “active Aval,” is just the same except that it
has behavioral control mechanisms that produce autonomous movement.
These mechanisms are accompanied by no phenomenal experiences of any
kind, and active Aval has no phenomenal desires to do one thing rather
than another. It has only conditional behavioral imperatives, like a robot,
which determine how it behaves in its environment. None of its behaviors
matter to it because it has no phenomenal response to any of its own
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behavior. This means that most of its propositional attitudes function
differently from ours.
“Beliefs” are similar for humans and Avals. The Aval has conscious
awareness of both “the proposition” believed and “that” it believes it.
Many other propositional attitudes, however, are valent for us, but are
not even phenomenal for Aval. The Aval is aware of the proposition that
is “desired”, or “feared”, but the “attitude” toward that proposition is
a functional disposition wholly lacking in phenomenology. When Aval
“fears that p” it is disposed to aversive behavior when consciously aware
that p (is true), but there is no valent phenomenology that accompanies
that aversive behavior (although there is conscious awareness that the
resulting behavior takes place). Like humans, it is consciously aware of
what it perceives and believes and how it behaves, but it has no positive
or negative phenomenal responses to any of it. It simply doesn’t care what
it perceives, believes, or does.
Our primary focus will be on the case of active Aval because its be-
havior will bear closer resemblance to human behavior, but the passive
case is instructive because it shows how little is required to meet the re-
quirements of awareness PI. According to the standard theory both active
and passive Aval have genuine intentional states. Their perceptual and
doxastic states meet all the same standards for intentionality that ours
do. There is certain content (like valent phenomenal concepts) that is be-
yond their cognitive reach, but we have phenomenal concept limitations
as well. According to NS-awareness PI, these limitations do nothing to
threaten the Aval’s general capacity for intentionality.
Valence PI challenges these assumptions. The generic version of this
theory, defined above, did not choose between three different alternatives.
Let us consider the two weakest, and therefore the most defensible, ver-
sions beginning with valence as a necessary condition:
N-Valence Phenomenal Intentionality: For an agent to have
genuine intentional states it is necessary that it has mental
states with contents that matter to the agent.
Remember, that for a content to “matter to” an agent it must be the
case that the agent has positively and/or negatively valent states that are
responsive to the content-bearing states. If N-valence PI is true then Aval
lacks intentionality altogether. It has neither perceptions nor beliefs with
genuine intentional content.
How plausible is this position? Defenders of NS-awareness PI will
answer, “not very”! They will argue that once we say that Aval “is con-
sciously aware of the meaning of p”, it is simply a contradiction to deny
that it understands the content “that p” or to deny that it has a genuine
mental state with the content “that p”. So what that nothing matters to
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Aval? That is a property wholly different from understanding, thinking
about, or believing.
I admit that, in the end, I may agree with this reasoning and reject
N-valence PI. However, some push-back is possible. Consider how dimin-
ished one’s mental life is once all valence has been stripped from it. I
suggest that such a creature has far more in common with a conscious-
less robot than it does with a normal human being. If we were to live
in community with such creatures, knowing that they didn’t care one
way or the other about any of the contents with which they engaged, we
might discover that we became wholly careless in our interpretation of
their utterances.
Ultimately, we might feel little or no obligation to interpret the crea-
tures’ thoughts and utterances as having the content that awareness PI
assigns to them. If this were to happen, it wouldn’t exactly support
the conclusion that Avals lack intentionality, but it might well have the
consequence that we would judge that the intrinsic value of non-valent in-
tentionality would be so diminished (as compared to the valent kind) that
“having genuine mental states” would be of less consequence than what
has traditionally been assumed by defenders of phenomenal consciousness.
4.2 Case 2: Algedon Has Rich Valent Experience
and No Cognitive Phenomenology
Consider next the position that valent phenomenology is not necessary
for intentionality but that it is sufficient:
S-Valence Phenomenal Intentionality: For an agent to have
genuine intentional states it is sufficient that it has mental
states with contents that matter to the agent.
To consider the plausibility of this theory, consider a second unique crea-
ture: Algedon (see Figure 2 above). Algedon is capable of a rich array
of valent experiences – pains and pleasures, joy and sadness, aesthetic
pleasure and disgust, despair and elation, and satisfaction and frustra-
tion in response to its level of goal-achievement. Things matter to Alge-
don. It cares about what it does, what it believes, how the world is, and
much more. At least, that is one way of describing the situation. Set-
tling on a proper description is complicated by the fact that Algedon has
no cognitive or perceptual phenomenology. Its perceptual and cognitive
capacities meet popular contemporary requirements for functional inten-
tionality, but it has no “conscious awareness” of anything it perceives or
believes.
Algedon has non-phenomenal, mechanistic sensory faculties that pro-
duce functional states that “carry information about” the environment
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(Shannon and Weaver 1949, Dretske 1981), but those states have no phe-
nomenal properties. We might imagine a cyborg with a properly function-
ing amygdala and the neural foundations for other valenced phenomenol-
ogy but with all sensory and cognitive capacities replaced by silicon-based
computational and sensory devices that (i) take in visual information from
the environment with a digital camera, (ii) generate symbols which meet
information-theoretic standards for being “representations” of the objects
perceived, and (iii) write statements into a “belief box” that meet its jus-
tificatory standards – all without conscious awareness of the content of
those states.
And yet, Algedon cares about the outcomes of those perceptual and
doxastic computations, at least in this respect: If its belief box con-
tains the sentence “my-dog-Scruffy-enjoys-being-my-pet”, that fact will
produce a fully realized phenomenological experience of happiness; if it
contains the negation of that sentence, it will produce phenomenal un-
happiness. If the visual system takes in information about a sunset with
a certain array of red-green-blue values, it will produce in Algedon strong
feelings of aesthetic pleasure; other visual arrays will produce feelings of
aesthetic disgust. Its rich algedonic phenomenology is sensitive to the
purely functional and information-bearing properties of its computational
states.
Does Algedon meet the requirements of S-Valence PI? Algedon has
valent phenomenological states which are sensitive to its changing compu-
tational states which reliably track states of the environment. So there is
at least a sense in which those information-bearing states matter to Alge-
don. Nonetheless, a defender of NS-awareness PI will likely argue that
the computational states, unaccompanied by any conscious awareness of
what those states mean, does not rise to the level of genuine “content”.
The claim would be that Algedons may have content-less raw feels, which
are evoked by certain syntactic objects, which bear causal relationships
to states of the environment, but that does not mean they actually believe
that the train has left the station or that it sees the tree in the quad.
Much of the force of this argument undoubtedly derives from the cen-
tral role that “conscious awareness of content” plays in our own mental
life. And yet, we must be careful that the harsh judgment that Algedons
lack intentionality is not motivated by a purely abstract commitment to
a philosophical theory that ignores the relevance of the value we would
naturally place on the inner mental life of the Algedon. If we were to
actually live in a community populated by large numbers of Algedons,
we might be surprised to discover that we unself-consciously empathized
with them because of the obvious richness of their valent mental states and
that we spontaneously interpreted their mental states as having genuine
intentional content.
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5. Tentative Conclusions
The strongest conclusion we might draw from our two cases is that
Avals do not have intentionality and that Algedons do. That would sup-
port NS-valent P and reject both elements of NS-awareness PI. A weaker
but more defensible option is to say that neither cognitive nor valent phe-
nomenology is necessary for intentionality but that either one is sufficient.
On this view, S-awareness PI and S-valent PI are both true. This is the
theory one would hold if both Avals and Algedons were judged to be
genuine intentional agents.
If this were true, there would be two different ways for phenomenal
consciousness to ground intentionality: (1) by having phenomenal states
that carry content via a conscious awareness of that content or (2) by
having valent phenomenal states that elevate information-carrying states
to the level of intentional content. Humans would have a bounty of riches,
meeting both conditions.
One final reflection. It is one thing to advance theories of intention-
ality in the abstract. It is another thing to observe actual members of a
linguistic community populated by diverse creatures and see what judg-
ments each makes regarding the intentionality of the others. Since we do
not yet live in such a community, we must ask instead: To what extent
would creatures (like ourselves) with a full complement of both cognitive
and valent phenomenal experiences respect as intentional agents creatures
with only valent phenomenology (Algedons) and creatures with only cog-
nitive phenomenology (Avals)?
To raise this question is to think of intentionality not as a theoretical
designation or a natural kind but as a social practice. If this distinction
can be born out, then we might distinguish between intentionality de jure
and intentionality de facto. In a previous paper (Anderson 2012), I began
to explore possible connections between the moral status of a cognitive
agent and its status as an intentional agent. These considerations provide
further support for the view that in a society populated with diverse
creatures, a race of Algedons might earn a kind of respect as intentional
agents that exceeded that enjoyed by a race of Avals. Is that relevant to
a theory of intentionality or not? The standard response would probably
be “no”! One goal of this paper has been to explore reasons for thinking
the correct answer might be “yes”.
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